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Collective Action with Incomplete Commitment: Experimental Evidence
Author(s) -
Schmitt Pamela,
Swope Kurtis,
Walker James
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
southern economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.762
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 2325-8012
pISSN - 0038-4038
DOI - 10.1002/j.2325-8012.2000.tb00299.x
Subject(s) - appropriation , collective action , action (physics) , imperfect , face (sociological concept) , resource (disambiguation) , mechanism (biology) , business , law and economics , public relations , political science , economics , computer science , sociology , law , epistemology , linguistics , computer network , social science , philosophy , physics , quantum mechanics , politics
Face‐to‐face communication is investigated as an efficiency‐enhancing mechanism in experimental common‐pool resource environments in which the appropriation activities of outside appropriators create coordination and monitoring problems for the communicating group. We identify three distinct problems that can threaten successful collective action. Outsiders respond strategically to reductions in appropriation by cooperating group members. Members of the communicating group deviate from agreements more frequently when monitoring is imperfect and over appropriation can be blamed on outsiders. Groups that are allowed to communicate anticipate the potential problems and have difficulty reaching agreements or committing to a specific appropriation rule.