Premium
The Median Voter According to GARP
Author(s) -
Turnbull Geoffrey K.,
Chang Chinkun
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
southern economic journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.762
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 2325-8012
pISSN - 0038-4038
DOI - 10.1002/j.2325-8012.1998.tb00116.x
Subject(s) - axiom , preference , test (biology) , voter model , population , government (linguistics) , revealed preference , public economics , public good , sample (material) , state (computer science) , economics , econometrics , microeconomics , statistics , demography , computer science , sociology , mathematics , paleontology , linguistics , philosophy , geometry , chemistry , chromatography , algorithm , biology
This paper adapts the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) empirical method to the public goods problem to test whether observed municipal public spending can be explained “as if” the city governments maximize the utility of the median income voter. It applies the test procedure for medium‐size municipal governments in five Midwest states. The data are consistent with GARP and reveal that the local governments in the sample behave as if they maximize median voter utility once we control for the state‐specific effects, government management structure, and population density.