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Do Mutual Obligation Breach Penalties Coerce Compliance with Government Expectations?
Author(s) -
Schooneveldt Simon
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
australian journal of social issues
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.417
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1839-4655
pISSN - 0157-6321
DOI - 10.1002/j.1839-4655.2004.tb01169.x
Subject(s) - obligation , ideology , government (linguistics) , compliance (psychology) , surprise , breach of contract , law , welfare , law and economics , political science , economics , social psychology , psychology , damages , politics , philosophy , linguistics
A Brisbane survey was conducted to examine some of the consequences of Centrelink breach penalties when applied to unemployment welfare recipients under the Howard Coalition Government's ideology of Mutual Obligation. Fifty‐six such recipients responded to the author's survey by completing a questionnaire about their experiences after receiving one or more breach penalties. The consequences of being breached for those respondents are contrasted with the Coalition Government's stated expectations for its Mutual Obligation driven breach penalty system. The background to the rise of Mutual Obligation as an ideology and the elevated incidence of breach penalties are briefly discussed, along with the report of the survey findings. Interestingly, two surprise findings are given specific focus as they offer new insight.