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Institutional Reform of Federalism: Changing the Players Rather Than the Rules of the Game
Author(s) -
Wälti Sonja
Publication year - 1996
Publication title -
swiss political science review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.632
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1662-6370
pISSN - 1424-7755
DOI - 10.1002/j.1662-6370.1996.tb00177.x
Subject(s) - federalism , veto , corporate governance , order (exchange) , economics , explanatory power , government (linguistics) , position (finance) , neglect , power (physics) , political science , public economics , economic system , public administration , law , politics , finance , medicine , philosophy , linguistics , physics , nursing , epistemology , quantum mechanics
The inconsistent policy outcomes, the increasing cantonal veto‐power and the general lack of central governance capacity are the main criticisms addressed when discussing Swiss federalism. This article examines the variables that are likely to modify the federal configuration in order to provide conclusions about the necessity of institutional reforms of federalism. It argues that the belief in the necessity for institutional reforms is derived from a purely institutionalist approach to Swiss federalism which tends to neglect important explanatory factors, e.g. the strategic interaction of decision makers. Consequently, it seems more promising to change the dominant strategies of the decision makers and the implementing authorities. Thus, the federal government could make it profitable for the cantons to rely on the center for assistance in order to gain control over the policy outcomes; and the cantons' veto‐position could be tempered by a more systematic integration of cantons as institutionalized corporate actors.