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WHY ARE THERE SO FEW COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FARMERS AND WATER SERVICES IN FRANCE? WATER POLICIES AND THE PROBLEM OF LAND USE RIGHTS
Author(s) -
Garin Patrice,
Barraqué Bernard
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
irrigation and drainage
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.421
H-Index - 38
eISSN - 1531-0361
pISSN - 1531-0353
DOI - 10.1002/ird.1657
Subject(s) - negotiation , agriculture , scope (computer science) , business , resource (disambiguation) , environmental planning , service provider , service (business) , natural resource economics , public economics , economics , political science , geography , archaeology , marketing , computer science , law , programming language , computer network
One of the recurrent shortcomings of water policy in France is the control of diffuse agricultural pollution. Numerous lacunae and incoherencies in the French Rural, Public Health, and Environmental Codes have hindered the effective implementation of efficient protection measures. In this paper, we underline the extent to which these incoherencies have hampered the emergence of cooperative agreements (CAs) between farmers and drinking water service providers. The theoretical framework of institutional resource regimes (IRRs) provides a key to understanding the failure of public policy to impose restrictions on agricultural land use rights and to encourage voluntary arrangements concerning agricultural practices. The IRR framework was applied before 2005 to 12 cases of public attempts to negotiate a reduction in polluting practices. Our study enabled us to characterise the lack of extent and coherence of the water sector's IRR in France. Since 2005, regulatory changes have extended the scope of this IRR with a view to making water, agriculture and health policies more coherent. We discuss the complexity of the new approach, and question its capacity to mobilise the actors concerned around the territorial reorganisation of agriculture aimed at reducing diffuse pollution. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.