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A theory of defeasible reasoning
Author(s) -
Pollock John L.
Publication year - 1991
Publication title -
international journal of intelligent systems
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.291
H-Index - 87
eISSN - 1098-111X
pISSN - 0884-8173
DOI - 10.1002/int.4550060103
Subject(s) - defeasible reasoning , semantic reasoner , defeasible estate , deductive reasoning , computer science , abductive reasoning , non monotonic logic , artificial intelligence , practical reason , analytic reasoning , reasoning system , model based reasoning , epistemology , cognitive science , knowledge representation and reasoning , philosophy , psychology
Reasoning can lead not only to the adoption of beliefs, but also to the retraction of beliefs. In philosophy, this is described by saying that reasoning is defeasible. My ultimate objective is the construction of a general theory of reasoning and its implementation in an automated reasoner capable of both deductive and defeasible reasoning. the resulting system is named “OSCAR.” This article addresses some of the theoretical underpinnings of OSCAR. This article extends my earlier theory in two directions. First, it addresses the question of what the criteria of adequacy should be for a defeasible reasoner. Second, it extends the theory to accommodate reasons of varying strengths.