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A Logical Multidemand Bargaining Model with Integrity Constraints
Author(s) -
Jing Xiaoxin,
Zhang Dongmo,
Luo Xudong,
Zhan Jieyu
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
international journal of intelligent systems
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.291
H-Index - 87
eISSN - 1098-111X
pISSN - 0884-8173
DOI - 10.1002/int.21799
Subject(s) - construct (python library) , bargaining problem , set (abstract data type) , pareto principle , computer science , mathematical optimization , mathematical economics , quality (philosophy) , logical conjunction , pareto optimal , symmetry (geometry) , mathematics , philosophy , geometry , epistemology , programming language
This paper proposes a logical model of multi‐demand bargaining with integrity constraints. We also construct a simultaneous concession solution to bargaining games of this kind and show that the solution is uniquely characterized by a set of logical properties. Moreover, we prove that the solution also satisfies the most fundamental game theoretic properties such as symmetry and Pareto optimality. In addition, by lots of simulation experiments we study how the number of conflicting demands, bargainers' risk attitude, and bargainer number influence the bargaining success rate and efficiency as well as the agreement quality.