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Financial Crises and the Dismissal of Central Bank Governors: New Evidence
Author(s) -
Artha I. Kadek Dian Sutrisna,
Haan Jakob
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
international journal of finance and economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.505
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1099-1158
pISSN - 1076-9307
DOI - 10.1002/ijfe.1508
Subject(s) - governor , economics , currency , financial system , debt , dismissal , monetary economics , financial crisis , finance , macroeconomics , political science , physics , law , thermodynamics
This paper examines whether financial crises affect the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. Employing a conditional fixed effects logit model for 101 countries during the period 1970–2007, we find that financial crises significantly increase the likelihood of a central bank governor turnover. When we decompose crises into banking, currency, and debt crises we find that banking crises and debt crises significantly increase the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. Our results also suggest that financial crises increase the probability that a non‐government ally will be appointed as new central bank governor. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.