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A case of constitutional apples and oranges: a functional comparison of pension priority and benefit guarantees in U.S., U.K. and Canadian insolvency and pension law regimes
Author(s) -
Davis Ronald B.
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
international insolvency review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.125
H-Index - 7
eISSN - 1099-1107
pISSN - 1180-0518
DOI - 10.1002/iir.172
Subject(s) - insolvency , arrears , creditor , incentive , pension , business , payment , economics , bankruptcy , actuarial science , finance , debt , market economy
Abstract Canada's insolvency law reform increased the priority granted to employer‐sponsored pension claims. The article compares the treatment of such claims in the U.S., the U.K. and Canada. A comparison of the legislative provisions concerning pension funding shortfalls from contribution arrears or economic underperformance in relation to the assumptions used for investment income or liability valuations finds that insolvency law has been used to address contribution arrears, but risks from economic underperformance have been addressed by pension benefit insurance. Post‐insolvency priority for contribution arrears provides appropriate incentives to discourage pre‐insolvency preferences for payments to other creditors, while shortfalls from economic underperformance do not involve issues of preference between creditors. The absence of any insolvency rationale for changing priority for shortfalls from economic underperformance and the likely disparity between the assets available to satisfy clams and the much larger amounts of such shortfalls makes the use of insolvency law to address this risk much less effective than insurance. Canada, however, has not adopted the insurance policy instrument used in the U.S. and U.K. to mitigate the impact of pension funding shortfalls. The constitutional inability of Canada to legislate in respect of matters of pension regulation that would allow it to control the well‐known insurance problems of moral hazard and adverse selection may explain why it has only chosen to adopt an insolvency policy instrument. However, a change in priorities in insolvency may generate incentives for secured creditors that either undermine or reinforce this policy choice. Secured creditors could attempt to circumvent the new priority scheme through private arrangements with the debtor or to increase their monitoring activities to ensure the debtor is current in its pension contributions. Secured creditors choices will be influenced by the bankruptcy courts' interpretation of the preference provisions in the insolvency legislation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.