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Act now: The effects of the 2008 Spanish disability reform
Author(s) -
Hill Matthew J.,
Silva Jose I.,
Vall Castello Judit
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
health economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.55
H-Index - 109
eISSN - 1099-1050
pISSN - 1057-9230
DOI - 10.1002/hec.3892
Subject(s) - incentive , baseline (sea) , disability benefits , medical model of disability , economics , demographic economics , public economics , medicine , gerontology , demography , psychology , actuarial science , political science , sociology , psychiatry , social security , microeconomics , market economy , law
The 2008 reform of the Spanish disability system reduced the benefits for individuals who have a short contributory history relative to their age. It also unintentionally introduced an incentive for individuals to apply for disability in the present. We use a lifecycle model and an empirical analysis to understand the overall impact of the reform. Our baseline estimates suggest that men and women who were affected by the reform were 46% and 22% more likely to be on permanent partial disability following the reform, respectively, and 55% and 46% more likely to be on total disability, respectively.