Operating on commission: analyzing how physician financial incentives affect surgery rates | Zendy

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Operating on commission: analyzing how physician financial incentives affect surgery rates

Author(s) -

Shafrin Jason

Publication year - 2010

Publication title -

health economics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 1.55

H-Index - 109

eISSN - 1099-1050

pISSN - 1057-9230

DOI - 10.1002/hec.1495

Subject(s) - capitation , referral , affect (linguistics) , incentive , compensation (psychology) , commission , actuarial science , business , order (exchange) , test (biology) , medicine , primary care , health care , public economics , operations management , finance , economics , family medicine , psychology , microeconomics , psychoanalysis , biology , economic growth , paleontology , communication , payment

This paper employs a nationally representative, household‐based dataset in order to test how the compensation method of both the specialists and the primary care providers affects surgery rates. After controlling for adverse selection, I find that when specialists are paid through a fee‐for‐system scheme rather than on a capitation basis, surgery rates increase 78%. The impact of primary care physician compensation on surgery rates depends on whether or not referral restrictions are present. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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