Neural Technologies: The Ethics of Intimate Access to the Mind

Science fiction is fast becoming reality as scientists and engineers seek to develop new ways of directly accessing and controlling our brains through brain‐computer and even brain‐to‐brain interfaces. If such research is to receive continuing public approval and support—and not invite opposition—it must anticipate the special ethical challenges it creates. By pointing to some of the acute concerns raised by neural engineering technologies—around issues of identity, normality, authority, responsibility, privacy, and justice—Eran Klein and colleagues model and stimulate the kind of reflection that will be needed as new brain technologies are developed . And yet, as I read their informative discussion, I find myself asking even more questions. One concerns the ethical novelty of these technologies. For example, in terms of questions of identity, normality, responsibility, and authority, how different is deep brain stimulation from the potent psychiatric drugs that have been administered for decades? How different in terms of issues of liability associated with malfunction or misuse are brain‐computer interfaces from other complex devices now routinely in use? Neither ethics nor law will have to rethink things from scratch as new neural devices and capabilities are introduced: the groundwork for answering some of these questions has already been laid in a variety of fields from bioethics, to health and product liability law. Nevertheless, I conclude that there are new questions here. It is not simply the fact that neural technologies pose questions of identity, privacy, and the like but that they do so with a degree of intensity that creates qualitatively new challenges .