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Animals with Human Cells in Their Brains: Implications for Research
Author(s) -
Maschke Karen J.
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
hastings center report
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.515
H-Index - 63
eISSN - 1552-146X
pISSN - 0093-0334
DOI - 10.1002/hast.1054
Subject(s) - insignificance , environmental ethics , non human , value (mathematics) , animal rights , value theory , social psychology , psychology , biology , law , political science , philosophy , machine learning , computer science
In “Human‐Animal Chimeras: The Moral Insignificance of Uniquely Human Capacities,” Julian Koplin argues against the views that all uniquely human traits have moral significance or that all the traits humans have in common with other animals “are morally insignificant.” He recommends instead the adoption of “a better framework for thinking about the moral status of part‐human beings,” one that emphasizes the “phenomenal value (or disvalue)” chimeric animals are likely “to enjoy (or suffer).” If the moral status of these chimeric animals is grounded in the phenomenal value of their interests—that is, their interests as nonhuman animals—current protections for animals used in research may be inadequate to protect those interests .