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Demutualization and customer protection at self‐regulatory financial exchanges
Author(s) -
Reiffen David,
Robe Michel
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
journal of futures markets
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.88
H-Index - 55
eISSN - 1096-9934
pISSN - 0270-7314
DOI - 10.1002/fut.20467
Subject(s) - incentive , shareholder , business , profit (economics) , finance , economics , market economy , microeconomics , corporate governance
In the past decade, many of the world's largest financial exchanges have demutualized, i.e., converted from mutual, not‐for‐profit organizations to publicly‐traded, for‐profit firms. In most cases, these exchanges have substantial responsibilities with respect to enforcing various “trade practice” regulations that protect investors from dishonest agents. We examine how the incentives to enforce such rules change as an exchange demutualizes. In contrast to oft‐stated concerns, we find that, in many circumstances, an exchange that maximizes shareholder (rather than member) income has a greater incentive to aggressively enforce these types of regulations. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 31:126–164, 2011