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Adaptive control‐theoretic detection of integrity attacks against cyber‐physical industrial systems
Author(s) -
RubioHernan Jose,
De Cicco Luca,
GarciaAlfaro Joaquin
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
transactions on emerging telecommunications technologies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.366
H-Index - 47
ISSN - 2161-3915
DOI - 10.1002/ett.3209
Subject(s) - cyber physical system , testbed , industrial control system , computer science , computer security , cover (algebra) , control (management) , strengths and weaknesses , adaptation (eye) , actuator , detector , control system security , computer network , engineering , information security , artificial intelligence , security service , telecommunications , software security assurance , mechanical engineering , philosophy , physics , optics , epistemology , operating system
The use of control‐theoretic solutions to detect attacks against cyber‐physical industrial systems is a growing area of research. Traditional literature proposes the use of control strategies to retain, eg, satisfactory close‐loop performance, as well as safety properties, when a communication network connects the distributed components of a physical system (eg, sensors, actuators, and controllers). However, the adaptation of these strategies to handle security incidents is an ongoing challenge. In this paper, we survey the advantages of a watermark‐based detector against some integrity attacks as well as the weaknesses against other attacks. To cover these weaknesses, we propose a new control and security strategy that complements the watermark‐based detector. We validate the detection efficiency of the new strategy via numeric simulation. Experimental results are also presented by using a laboratory testbed based on supervisory control and data acquisition industrial protocols.