Premium
Counter‐argument self‐efficacy predicts choice of belief‐defense strategies
Author(s) -
Goldberg Matthew H.,
Carmichael Cheryl L.,
Hardin Curtis D.
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
european journal of social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.609
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1099-0992
pISSN - 0046-2772
DOI - 10.1002/ejsp.2603
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , psychology , social psychology , mechanism (biology) , false belief , order (exchange) , epistemology , theory of mind , cognition , philosophy , economics , biochemistry , chemistry , neuroscience , finance
Research has identified many strategies people use to defend against belief‐inconsistent information. However, little research has identified factors that predict which defense strategy people will use when more than one is available. Two experiments tested whether people choose to counter‐argue belief‐inconsistent information because they believe arguing will be successful, but resort to weaker defense strategies because they believe arguing will be unsuccessful. Exposure to strong versus weak belief‐inconsistent information caused a decrease in counter‐arguing and an increase in ignoring (Experiment 1) or claiming a belief to be a matter of opinion (untestable) rather than a matter of fact (testable; Experiment 2). Consistent with self‐efficacy theory, expectations of successful counter‐arguing was the mechanism responsible for both effects. When people feel less capable of successfully counter‐arguing because the information is too difficult to refute, they resort to epistemically weaker defense strategies in order to preserve their belief.