Market forces, negotiator frames and transaction outcomes

Although implicit framing differences have been advanced as an explanation of the buyers advantage, two necessary preconditions must be met to sustain this model: a demonstration that negatively‐framed negotiators are advantaged in negotiations and that buyer role labels invoke a negative frame. A modification of Neale, Northcraft, Magliozzi and Bazerman s (1986) simulation created a role‐neutral setting in which positively‐framed negotiators bargained against negatively‐framed negotiators, thus testing the first of these preconditions. Experiment 1 found no differences in the outcomes of positively‐ and negatively‐framed negotiators, a finding that could be attributed to relatively low market competitiveness. A second experiment, by creating power imbalanced negotiation markets, sought to increase market distributiveness and strengthen framing effects. Results showed that both high power and negatively‐framed negotiators were significantly advantaged, providing conditional support for the implicit framing model, However unlike role, frame interacted with power suggesting that the two variables are not functionally equivalent. These findings are interpreted to suggest that factors other than implicit framing differences account for the buyers advantage. More generally these results suggest that frame is responsive to situational variables and that such variables, by influencing negotiation processes, mediate the relationship between negotiator frames and negotiation outcomes.