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Exploring the role of personal normative beliefs in the theory of reasoned action: The problem of discriminating between alternative path models
Author(s) -
Budd Richard J.,
Spencer Christopher P.
Publication year - 1985
Publication title -
european journal of social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.609
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1099-0992
pISSN - 0046-2772
DOI - 10.1002/ejsp.2420150305
Subject(s) - normative , psychology , theory of reasoned action , social psychology , normative social influence , action (physics) , path analysis (statistics) , epistemology , philosophy , statistics , physics , mathematics , quantum mechanics
In the 1967 version of Fishbein's model of the attitude‐behaviour relationship a distinction was drawn between personal and social normative beliefs. Personal normative beliefs were later removed from the model on the grounds that they act as an alternative measure of behavioural intention. It is argued that the existing literature does not support this hypothesis and data is presented which indicates that personal normative beliefs are not an alternative measure of behavioural intention. It is argued that personal normative beliefs can be reconceptualized as measuring a person's ideal behavioural intention; a variable which mediates the relationship between attitudes, subjective norms and intentions, Evidence is presented which supports this hypothesis, but it is further demonstrated that an alternative model can be fitted to the present data. It is argued that it is impossible to discriminate between these alternative models on the basis of path analytic techniques, and the implications that this finding has for attitude research are discussed.