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Coalition formation on the gameboard
Author(s) -
Wilke Henk,
Mulder Mauk
Publication year - 1971
Publication title -
european journal of social psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.609
H-Index - 111
eISSN - 1099-0992
pISSN - 0046-2772
DOI - 10.1002/ejsp.2420010305
Subject(s) - social psychology , power (physics) , psychology , mathematical economics , positive economics , economics , physics , quantum mechanics
This study explored the different interpretations of the 4‐3‐2 power pattern (Caplow, 1956) in the standard pachisiboard situation, originated by Vinacke and Arkoff (1957). The results show that A (=4) does not misperceive his power more than B (=3) or C (=2), as Kelley and Arrowood (1960) and Vinacke and Arkoff (1957) assumed. The results also did not fit the predictions of game theory (Shapley and Shubik, 1964). Gamson's (1964) explanation was not confirmed either. The conspiracy hypothesis (Hoffman et al., 1954), which states that if the players perceive that they are comparable and one of the players is given an initial advantage, then the two other players will conspire against him, can explain the results of this study reasonably well.