Premium
A study of a routing attack in OLSR‐based mobile ad hoc networks
Author(s) -
Kannhavong Bounpadith,
Nakayama Hidehisa,
Kato Nei,
Jamalipour Abbas,
Nemoto Yoshiaki
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
international journal of communication systems
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.344
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1099-1131
pISSN - 1074-5351
DOI - 10.1002/dac.870
Subject(s) - computer science , computer network , mobile ad hoc network , optimized link state routing protocol , wireless ad hoc network , node (physics) , packet drop attack , routing protocol , ad hoc wireless distribution service , link state routing protocol , adaptive quality of service multi hop routing , destination sequenced distance vector routing , computer security , routing (electronic design automation) , wireless , telecommunications , network packet , structural engineering , engineering
Abstract A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of mobile nodes which are able to communicate with each other without relying on predefined infrastructures or central administration. Due to their flexibilities and easy deployment, MANET can be applied in situation where network infrastructures are not available. However, due to their unique characteristics such as open medium and the lack of central administration, they are much more vulnerable to malicious attacks than a conventional infrastructured wireless network. MANET employs routing to provide connectivity for mobile nodes that are not within direct wireless transmission range. Existing routing protocols in MANET assume a trusted and cooperative environment. However, in hostile environment, mobile nodes are susceptible to various kinds of routing attacks. In this paper, we show that an OLSR MANET node is prone to be isolated by malicious attack called Node Isolation attack. After analysing the attack in detail, we present a technique to mitigate the impact of the attack and improve the performance of the network when the attack is launched. The results of our implementations illustrate that the proposed solution can mitigate the attack efficiently. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.