Premium
Improved impossible differential and biclique cryptanalysis of HIGHT
Author(s) -
Azimi Seyyed Arash,
Ahmadi Siavash,
Ahmadian Zahra,
Mohajeri Javad,
Aref Mohammad Reza
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
international journal of communication systems
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.344
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1099-1131
pISSN - 1074-5351
DOI - 10.1002/dac.3382
Subject(s) - block cipher , computer science , impossible differential cryptanalysis , differential cryptanalysis , slide attack , cryptanalysis , complete bipartite graph , differential (mechanical device) , algorithm , plaintext , boomerang attack , ciphertext , arithmetic , theoretical computer science , mathematics , cryptography , bipartite graph , encryption , computer security , physics , graph , thermodynamics
Summary HIGHT is a lightweight block cipher introduced in CHES 2006 by Hong et al as a block cipher suitable for low‐resource applications. In this paper, we propose improved impossible differential and biclique attacks on HIGHT block cipher both exploiting the permutation‐based property of the cipher's key schedule algorithm as well as its low diffusion. For impossible differential attack, we found a new 17‐round impossible differential characteristic that enables us to propose a new 27‐round impossible differential attack. The total time complexity of the attack is 2 120.4 where an amount of 2 59.3 chosen plaintext‐ciphertext pairs and 2 107.4 memory are required. We also instantiate a new biclique cryptanalysis of HIGHT, which is based on the new idea of splitting each of the forward and backward keys into 2 parts where the computations associated to each one are performed independently. The time complexity and data complexity of this attack are 2 125.7 and 2 42 , respectively. To the best of our knowledge, this is the fastest biclique attack on full‐round HIGHT.