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Efficient and secure certificateless signature scheme in the standard model
Author(s) -
Pang Liaojun,
Hu Yufei,
Liu Yi,
Xu Kedong,
Li Huixian
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
international journal of communication systems
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.344
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1099-1131
pISSN - 1074-5351
DOI - 10.1002/dac.3041
Subject(s) - key escrow , random oracle , computer science , public key cryptography , computer security , scheme (mathematics) , cryptography , signature (topology) , key (lock) , id based cryptography , standard model (mathematical formulation) , encryption , mathematics , key distribution , mathematical analysis , geometry , archaeology , gauge (firearms) , history
Summary Certificateless cryptography not only enjoys many advantages of identity‐based cryptography (IBC) but also eliminates the fatal drawback, which is called the key escrow in IBC. Most of the early certificateless signature schemes are secure based on the random oracle model, and nowadays, more and more researchers put emphasis on the scheme based on the standard model. In 2010, Xia et al . demonstrated that the previous schemes in the standard model cannot resist the public‐key‐replace attack. In 2012, for the purpose of overcoming the common drawback, Yu et al . presented a new certificateless signature scheme. However, under the public‐key‐replace attack and malicious‐but‐passive key generation center attack, this scheme is proven to be vulnerable. Moreover, there are too many bilinear pairings used in this scheme, which lead to its low computation efficiency. Aiming at the weakness of the scheme byYu et al ., we propose a new certificateless signature scheme, which provides stronger security and higher computational efficiency than the existing schemes. In addition, according to the concept of Girault's trust level, the new scheme can reach trust level 3. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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