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Button‐based method for the prevention of near field communication relay attacks
Author(s) -
Kang Sukin,
Kim Jonguk,
Hong Manpyo
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
international journal of communication systems
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.344
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1099-1131
pISSN - 1074-5351
DOI - 10.1002/dac.2751
Subject(s) - relay , computer science , near field communication , bluetooth , computer security , computer network , key exchange , interface (matter) , simple (philosophy) , cryptography , encryption , key (lock) , wireless , telecommunications , public key cryptography , ultra high frequency , power (physics) , physics , philosophy , bubble , epistemology , quantum mechanics , maximum bubble pressure method , parallel computing
Summary In this study, we developed a novel method for preventing relay attacks over near field communication (NFC) using a simple interface. NFC provides standardized short‐range contactless communication using one of the radio frequency identification communication channels. NFC‐enabled mobile devices can exchange information in close proximity (within 4 cm). In particular, modern mobile phones have adopted NFC technology because of its promising functionalities, for example, mobile payments, Bluetooth pairing, and electronic keys. The distance limitation of NFC communication offers security advantages against passive or active attackers, but it is still vulnerable to relay attacks. During a relay attack, adversaries relay messages between two legitimate participants without any attempt at message modification. There is no requirement for knowledge of a cryptographic key or to share secrets with victims, therefore encrypting messages is not a solution that prevents relay attacks. We propose a new method for relay attack prevention, which uses a simple interface with only one button. In our scheme, the elapsed time of button pressing is used for verification. Our experimental results obtained using the proposed scheme demonstrated the accuracy of our method for verifying human users and the difficulties experienced by human attackers. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.