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Side‐channel analysis of the modular inversion step in the RSA key generation algorithm
Author(s) -
Cabrera Aldaya Alejandro,
Cuiman Márquez Raudel,
Cabrera Sarmiento Alejandro J.,
SánchezSolano Santiago
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
international journal of circuit theory and applications
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.364
H-Index - 52
eISSN - 1097-007X
pISSN - 0098-9886
DOI - 10.1002/cta.2283
Subject(s) - side channel attack , power analysis , computer science , key (lock) , algorithm , modular exponentiation , key generation , public key cryptography , trace (psycholinguistics) , adversary , binary number , cryptography , computer engineering , computer network , arithmetic , computer security , mathematics , encryption , linguistics , philosophy
Summary This paper studies the security of the RSA key generation algorithm with regard to side‐channel analysis and presents a novel approach that targets the simple power analysis (SPA) vulnerabilities that may exist in an implementation of the binary extended Euclidean algorithm (BEEA). The SPA vulnerabilities described, together with the properties of the values processed by the BEEA in the context of RSA key generation, represent a serious threat for an implementation of this algorithm. It is shown that an adversary can disclose the private key employing only one power trace with a success rate of 100 % – an improvement on the 25% success rate achieved by the best side‐channel analysis carried out on this algorithm. Two very different BEEA implementations are analyzed, showing how the algorithm's SPA leakages could be exploited. Also, two countermeasures are discussed that could be used to reduce those SPA leakages and prevent the recovery of the RSA private key. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.