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States of mind and metacognitive dysfunctions are different in the various personality disorders: a reply to Ryle (2005)
Author(s) -
Carcione Antonino,
Semerari Antonio,
Dimaggio Giancarlo,
Nicolò Giuseppe
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
clinical psychology and psychotherapy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.315
H-Index - 76
eISSN - 1099-0879
pISSN - 1063-3995
DOI - 10.1002/cpp.462
Subject(s) - psychology , metacognition , schema (genetic algorithms) , interpersonal communication , mentalization , personality , cognitive psychology , set (abstract data type) , personality disorders , cognition , subject (documents) , theory of mind , cognitive science , social psychology , psychiatry , machine learning , library science , computer science , programming language
Our reply to Ryle concentrates on the following points: (1) we are not upholding a purely cognitive idea of the schema concept, but rather that individuals are driven by expectations that are open to being rewritten in the course of interpersonal relationships; (2) metacognition is not a purely theoretical activity, but includes an ability to simulate the other's mind and is subject to variations in the course of interpersonal relationships; (3) there is clinical and research evidence supporting the idea that metarepresentative malfunctioning differs between one disorder and another and that it is not a case of a generic difficulty in self‐reflection; (4) the individual states of minds are not special features of particular personality disorders (PDs) and do not distinguish a patient from a person without problems. The pathological element is that in the PDs the set of states is limited and an individual is unable to switch into states that are adaptive or free of suffering. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.