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Evolutionary game analysis on competition strategy choice of application providers
Author(s) -
Ye Ayong,
Jin Junlin,
Yang Zhijiang,
Zhao Ziwen,
Meng LingYu
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
concurrency and computation: practice and experience
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.309
H-Index - 67
eISSN - 1532-0634
pISSN - 1532-0626
DOI - 10.1002/cpe.5446
Subject(s) - market share , permission , revenue , competition (biology) , internet privacy , multitude , computer science , game theory , evolutionary game theory , mechanism (biology) , business , computer security , microeconomics , marketing , economics , finance , ecology , philosophy , epistemology , political science , law , biology
Summary Modern smartphone platforms offer a multitude of useful features to their users, but at the same time, they highly affect privacy, which may lead to unnecessary personal data being collected. In this paper, we proposed an evolutionary game model to study permission request strategies of the bounded rational application providers. We study the proposed model with detailed simulations. Initial results demonstrate that evolution processes are influenced by four factors: revenue increase ratio, market share, credit cost, and market attraction. It also suggests that establishing a privacy alarm mechanism not only can improve the users' privacy awareness but also decrease the market share when providers over‐request permissions and push them request permissions properly.