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Resolving a common vulnerability in secret sharing scheme–based data outsourcing schemes
Author(s) -
Ghasemi Reza
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
concurrency and computation: practice and experience
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.309
H-Index - 67
eISSN - 1532-0634
pISSN - 1532-0626
DOI - 10.1002/cpe.5363
Subject(s) - computer science , outsourcing , cloud computing , scalability , vulnerability (computing) , popularity , computer security , secret sharing , cloud storage , data sharing , database , confidentiality , scheme (mathematics) , cryptography , encryption , business , psychology , social psychology , medicine , mathematical analysis , alternative medicine , mathematics , pathology , marketing , operating system
Summary Every day, the amount of generated data from different resources are increasing significantly and posing new serious challenges in terms of data storage and maintaining. As a solution, outsourcing data to a public cloud server with high storage and processing capacity sounds reasonable in comparison with storing in local data storage. Therefore, the database as a service (DaaS) paradigm has gained much popularity over the last decade since the introduction of cloud services. Storing confidential data into a third party arises some concerns regarding security and privacy of the data. One popular approach to address these problems in data outsourcing is utilizing secret sharing and distributing sensitive data among several databases. In this paper, we introduce a flaw that exhibits a deficiency relating to current schemes. This flaw indicates an intrinsic vulnerability to such methods and necessitates a reconsideration of these schemes. Moreover, a new way will be developed to resolve this problem in the previous schemes, which can be employed in all current schemes to mitigate the mentioned concern. Finally, a comprehensive implementation demonstrates that the proposed method is scalable to meet increasing demands in large databases.