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Self‐certified proxy convertible authenticated encryption: formal definitions and a provably secure scheme
Author(s) -
Xie Qi,
Wang Guilin,
Xia Fubiao,
Chen Deren
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
concurrency and computation: practice and experience
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.309
H-Index - 67
eISSN - 1532-0634
pISSN - 1532-0626
DOI - 10.1002/cpe.3058
Subject(s) - random oracle , discrete logarithm , computer science , convertible , provable security , verifiable secret sharing , authenticated encryption , public key cryptography , theoretical computer science , digital signature , scheme (mathematics) , encryption , proxy (statistics) , computer security , mathematics , hash function , programming language , engineering , mathematical analysis , structural engineering , set (abstract data type) , machine learning
SUMMARY In 2009, Wu and Lin introduced the concept of self‐certified proxy convertible authenticated encryption (SP‐CAE) by integrating self‐certified public‐key system and designated verifier proxy signature with message recovery. They also presented the first SP‐CAE scheme which is based the discrete logarithm problem. However, Wu‐Lin scheme is not secure as Xie et al . recently showed that this scheme is existentially forgeable under adaptive chosen warrants, unconfidentiable and verifiable under adaptive chosen messages and designated verifiers. In this paper, we first discuss the security requirements of SP‐CAE and then formally define unforgeability, message confidentiality, and unverifiability. Consequently, the first complete formal model of SP‐CAE is proposed. After that, we propose a provably secure SP‐CAE scheme by using two‐party Schnorr signature introduced by Nicolosi et al . in 2003. Finally, we prove the formal security of the proposed scheme in the random oracle model under the discrete logarithm assumption. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.