Premium
Attacks via record multiplicity on cancelable biometrics templates
Author(s) -
Li Cai,
Hu Jiankun
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
concurrency and computation: practice and experience
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.309
H-Index - 67
eISSN - 1532-0634
pISSN - 1532-0626
DOI - 10.1002/cpe.3042
Subject(s) - template , computer science , biometrics , transformation (genetics) , cryptanalysis , statistic , fingerprint (computing) , algorithm , cryptography , multiplicity (mathematics) , data mining , theoretical computer science , computer security , mathematics , programming language , statistics , mathematical analysis , biochemistry , chemistry , gene
Various template protection techniques have been developed in the past few years, among which cancelable biometrics is a very popular and efficient one. It uses a noninvertible transformation to map an original template to a transformed domain to prevent the recovery of the original template from a compromised transformed template. Generally, cross‐template attacks over cancellable template schemes are evaluated through statistic independence metrics. In this paper, we investigate approaches to launch attacks through cryptanalysis. Four typical cancelable fingerprint template design algorithms have been investigated by applying the attack via record multiplicity attack to retrieve the original template. Concrete attack examples are also given to make the demonstration more intuitive and comprehensive. The results show that all of them are vulnerable if an attacker can obtain multiple transformed templates and their corresponding transformation parameters. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.