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Reduction in visual science: A philosopher's View
Author(s) -
Hardin C. L.
Publication year - 1989
Publication title -
color research and application
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.393
H-Index - 62
eISSN - 1520-6378
pISSN - 0361-2317
DOI - 10.1002/col.5080140205
Subject(s) - phenomenology (philosophy) , sensory system , realization (probability) , epistemology , cognitive science , psychology , cognitive psychology , philosophy , mathematics , statistics
Suppose that we had a complete, utopian understanding of the workings of the nervous system. Would we thereby know all that there is to know about subjective sensory experience? It has been maintained that we would not, and that although sensory experiences are caused by brain events, they cannot be identical with these events. We shall consider three arguments that purport to lead to this conclusion, and discover that each of them is defective. It will then be argued that the question of whether sensory experiences are identical with brain events is an empirical one, to be settled by future science. An affirmative answer will require that the phenomenology be properly regimented, and shown to be isomorphic with an appropriate subset of neural processes. Although the realization of these conditions must be regarded as utopian, contemporary visual science has made progress in this direction.