Introduction to this Issue: The neuroscience and psychology of moral decision making and the law

On June 12, 2008, in Mumbai, India, a judge convicted Aditi Sharma of murder based in part on results of the Bain Electrical Oscillations Signature test (BEOS). This technology involves electroencephalography and software developed by Chanpadi Raman Mukundan, who directed psychology at the National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences in Bangalore, India. Mukandan’s BEOS technique was based uponmethods developed at U.S. universities by neuroscientists such as Emanuel Danchin, Lawrence A. Farwell and J. Peter Rosenfeld. Ms. Sharma, who was accused of killing her former fiance, agreed to undergo the BEOS test. With the electroencephalography in progress, investigators read aloud her account of what happened interspersed with neutral statements. In relating EEG changes to statements read and heard by Ms. Sharma, it was inferred that she had ‘‘experienced knowledge’’ of the murder. Judge S. S-Phansalker-Joshi provided within his opinion an extensive apologia of the BEOS technique and its value in corroborating other sources (Giridharadas, 2008). If such a relatively untested brain mapping technique can be admitted into evidence and used for criminal conviction in the world’s largest democracy, what next? This one case illustrates the topical importance of examining forensic applications of neuroscientific findings, and their strengths and limitations both as scientific advancements and in terms of reliability and relevance to legal questions such as those concerning criminal responsibility. Fundamental for criminal responsibility are intentionality, rationality, self-control and consciousness. The formation and implementation of intent, which is the core function of the human will (Felthous, 2008), relies on the capacities for rationality, selfcontrol and consciousness. Voluntariness, too, is often considered an element of criminal responsibility even if not explicitly stated in the federal penal code and several state penal codes (Denno, 2002). Like consciousness, voluntariness is defined variously, and some statutes using the term do not define it. Two common interpretations of the descriptor ‘‘voluntary’’ are ‘‘1. Done by design or intention ‘voluntary act’ [and] 2. Unconstrained by interference; not impelled by outside influence ‘voluntary statement’’’ (Garner, 1999). Thus, voluntary can mean done with intent, self-control and/or free of external control, but, Denno (2002) argues, done consciously. Behavioral Sciences and the Law Behav. Sci. Law 27: 119–121 (2009) Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/bsl.858