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Interpretive flexibility: why doesn't insight incite controversy in mental health law?
Author(s) -
Diesfeld Kate,
Sjöström Stefan
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
behavioral sciences and the law
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.649
H-Index - 74
eISSN - 1099-0798
pISSN - 0735-3936
DOI - 10.1002/bsl.705
Subject(s) - credibility , objectivity (philosophy) , flexibility (engineering) , mental health , function (biology) , context (archaeology) , jurisprudence , meaning (existential) , bridge (graph theory) , psychology , sociology , epistemology , social psychology , engineering ethics , medicine , law , political science , psychotherapist , engineering , paleontology , philosophy , statistics , mathematics , evolutionary biology , biology
This research investigates how the term “insight” was employed in 25 decisions from mental health review proceedings in Victoria, Australia. The application of insight appears problematic in these decisions. First, there is little clarification of its meaning. Second, the logic applied when insight is related to compliance is often unclear. Third, there are frequent allusions to an implicit and undefined scale of insight, offering the appearance of objectivity. We have analysed insight as an ‘interpretive resource’, focusing on its various functions in the complex social context of commitment hearings and with a view to its therapeutic jurisprudence implications. The variable application of insight—its interpretive flexibility—appears useful in addressing complex problems faced by review boards. Hence, a key function of insight is to bridge between legal and clinical discourses. Insight is also a convenient means to avoid complicated debates regarding the person's credibility. By analysing insight in Victoria, we hope to contribute to better theoretical understanding of decision‐making patterns in mental health law in general. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.