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The effects of rational and experiential information processing of expert testimony in death penalty cases
Author(s) -
Krauss Daniel A.,
Lieberman Joel D.,
Olson Jodi
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
behavioral sciences and the law
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.649
H-Index - 74
eISSN - 1099-0798
pISSN - 0735-3936
DOI - 10.1002/bsl.621
Subject(s) - experiential learning , psychology , experiential knowledge , cognition , experiential avoidance , information processing , actuarial science , social psychology , cognitive psychology , psychiatry , epistemology , economics , philosophy , mathematics education , anxiety
Past research examining the effects of actuarial and clinical expert testimony on defendants' dangerousness in Texas death penalty sentencing has found that jurors are more influenced by less scientific pure clinical expert testimony and less influenced by more scientific actuarial expert testimony (Krauss & Lee, 2003; Krauss & Sales, 2001). By applying cognitive–experiential self‐theory (CEST) to juror decision‐making, the present study was undertaken in an attempt to offer a theoretical rationale for these findings. Based on past CEST research, 163 mock jurors were either directed into a rational mode or experiential mode of processing. Consistent with CEST and inconsistent with previous research using the same stimulus materials, results demonstrate that jurors in a rational mode of processing more heavily weighted actuarial expert testimony in their dangerousness assessments, while those jurors in the experiential condition were more influenced by clinical expert testimony. The policy implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.