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Law and the fireside inductions (with postscript): Some reflections of a clinical psychologist
Author(s) -
Meehl Paul E.
Publication year - 1989
Publication title -
behavioral sciences and the law
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.649
H-Index - 74
eISSN - 1099-0798
pISSN - 0735-3936
DOI - 10.1002/bsl.2370070408
Subject(s) - generalizability theory , introspection , causal inference , relevance (law) , inference , psychology , population , social psychology , cognitive psychology , computer science , law , sociology , medicine , artificial intelligence , political science , developmental psychology , demography , pathology
Legislators and judges have relied upon the “fireside inductions” (common sense, anecdotal, introspective, and culturally transmitted beliefs about human behavior) in making and enforcing law as a mode of social control. The behavior sciences conflict at times with the fireside inductions. While the sources of error in “common knowledge” about behavior are considerable, the behavior sciences are plagued with methodological problems that often render their generalized conclusions equally dubious. Legal applications of generalizations from experimental research on humans and animals in laboratory contexts often involve risky parametric and population extrapolations. Statistical analysis of file data suffers from inherent interpretative ambiguities as to causal inference from correlations. Quasi‐experiments in the “real‐life” setting may often be the methodologically optimal data‐source. A postscript updates the original text and addresses seven additional topics: (1) abuse of significance tests, (2) failure to report overlap, (3) causal inference from correlation, (4) immediate transitions from group differences on psychological tests to “unfairness,” (5) double standard of proof of generalizability, (6) social science in legal education, and (7) incompetent testimony by psychologists.