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Do financial penalties for environmental violations facilitate improvements in corporate environmental performance? An empirical investigation
Author(s) -
Shevchenko Anton
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
business strategy and the environment
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.123
H-Index - 105
eISSN - 1099-0836
pISSN - 0964-4733
DOI - 10.1002/bse.2711
Subject(s) - receipt , business , government (linguistics) , environmental management system , point (geometry) , environmental policy , empirical research , environmental impact assessment , accounting , environmental economics , economics , ecology , linguistics , philosophy , geometry , mathematics , epistemology , irrigation , biology
Environmental regulations play an essential role in managing firm behavior and providing a reference point for the minimum standards of corporate environmental performance, yet certain firms fail to ensure their environmental performance meets these standards. This research focuses on public firms that the US government has penalized for violating environmental regulations and investigates whether these firms subsequently improved their environmental performance. Surprisingly, neither the receipt of a penalty for an environmental violation nor the imposition of a greater penalty was associated with improvements in environmental performance. Instead, a penalty for environmental violation predicted further, albeit mild, deterioration in environmental performance. While the existing literature has established that financial penalties deter most firms from committing environmental violations, this research contributes to this literature by revealing that these penalties fail to motivate firms that have violated environmental regulations to improve their environmental performance.