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A test of the von Neumann‐Morgenstern stable set solution in cooperative non‐sidepayment N ‐person games
Author(s) -
Michener H. Andrew,
Potter Kathryn,
Macheel Greg B.,
Depies Charles G.
Publication year - 1984
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830290103
Subject(s) - set (abstract data type) , imputation (statistics) , mathematical economics , von neumann architecture , von neumann–morgenstern utility theorem , core (optical fiber) , independent set , computer science , preference , mathematics , expected utility hypothesis , theoretical computer science , statistics , missing data , machine learning , telecommunications , graph , programming language , operating system
This article reports a competitive test of the von Neumann‐Morgenstern stable set solution against the imputation set and the undominated set in cooperative non‐side‐payment games. Two laboratory experiments involving group decision making were conducted with 3‐person and 4‐person non‐sidepayment games having empty core. Predictions for the undominated set, imputation set, and stable set were computed under parameters of α‐effectiveness and strict preference. Goodness‐of‐fit results show that the stable set predicts the observed outcomes more efficiently than do the other solutions tested.