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Power and importance in a theory of lobbying
Author(s) -
BenDov Yosi,
Shilony Yuval
Publication year - 1982
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830270107
Subject(s) - power (physics) , a priori and a posteriori , resolution (logic) , law and economics , positive economics , economics , computer science , epistemology , artificial intelligence , philosophy , physics , quantum mechanics
Abstract Who are the powerful, important, or key figures in a sociopolitical or economic body? And whom should a lobbyist, who seeks to minimize his effort, select to approach and promote a decision he favors? These are related but not identical questions. Answers to the first question are attempted by using various indices of power in the literature (Shapley & Shubik, 1954; Banzhaf, 1965; Young, 1978). They typically investigate the a priori power of a decision‐making body's member, i.e., without knowing what issue is at stake, and, hence, before knowing the opinions of the other members. The lobbyist, on the other hand, while considering the members' a priori power must also pay attention to their given opinions concerning the particular resolution at stake. That gives rise to a definition of a member's importance : the sensitivity of the resolution's probability of success if this member were to change his mind, given the opinions of the other members. In other words, the most important person is the one who, if he changed his mind, would matter most. It transpires that power and importance may be held by different persons. The lobbyist, who tries to change the members' minds using his limited resources, must also take into account the members' susceptibility to influence. The lobbyist's problem is discussed and analyzed within the framework of simple games enhanced by influence functions which are the production functions of lobbying.