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Expected utility and approval voting
Author(s) -
Fishburn Peter C.,
Brams Steven J.
Publication year - 1981
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830260206
Subject(s) - voting , bullet voting , approval voting , disapproval voting , cardinal voting systems , anti plurality voting , equity (law) , outcome (game theory) , actuarial science , political science , economics , public economics , microeconomics , law , politics
Approval voting is concerned with the decision behavior of organizations and societal systems. As with other voting procedures, it elicits and converts input from voters into a social decision. Under approval voting, each voter in a multicandidate election can vote for as many candidates as he wishes. The candidate with the most votes is elected. Approval voting is analyzed here from the viewpoint of expected utility maximizing voters. Approximately optimal voting strategies are developed. The relative abilities of votes for different numbers of candidates to affect the outcome are assessed, and the issue of equity among voters is addressed. It is argued that approval voting is more equitable than the common plurality voting system.