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Conflict as a determinant of territory
Author(s) -
Schrodt Philip A.
Publication year - 1981
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830260104
Subject(s) - demise , outcome (game theory) , null model , ethnic conflict , politics , econometrics , positive economics , mathematical economics , mathematics , political science , economics , law , combinatorics
A model of spatial conflict is developed in which the outcome of the conflict is determined by the number of individuals of the same “type”—e.g., religion, ethnic group, or political belief—adjacent to the conflict. The model is discussed with respect to society and supranational systems, but may also be applicable at lower levels. This model is shown to generate territorial grouping out of an initially random distribution of individual types. This model is compared to null models in which the outcome and initiation of conflicts do not depend on spatial relationships and it is shown that these models do not generate territories quickly. A model in which the initiation of conflicts is spatially independent is shown to be able to dissolve existing territorial groupings, which is a result similar to Herz's hypothesis on the demise of territorial states. It is also shown that two types cannot coexist, even with territories, unless they are equal in power. The model is developed as both a computer simulation and a mathematical model; a number of generalizations of the model are suggested which might make it applicable to other social and biological processes.