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The bargaining set in voting games
Author(s) -
Schofield Norman
Publication year - 1980
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830250204
Subject(s) - mathematical economics , voting , set (abstract data type) , class (philosophy) , economics , microeconomics , value (mathematics) , game theory , division (mathematics) , fair division , computer science , mathematics , political science , law , artificial intelligence , machine learning , politics , programming language , arithmetic
This article discusses decision making at the level of the society. Although voting games by rational actors are known to be highly unstable, it has been argued that only minimal winning coalitions should form. The bargaining set is presented as an empirically and theoretically relevant solution theory. This theory assigns stable outcomes to some coalitions. It is shown that bargaining set theory does not necessarily predict minimal winning coalitions in voting games with transferable value (i.e., games of division). On the other hand, in games of exchange or log rolling, it is shown that the bargaining set predicts equitable or fair payoffs. This result lends weight to the size principle for this class of games.