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Decision pressures in 2 × 2 games
Author(s) -
Lendenmann Karl W.,
Rapoport Anatol
Publication year - 1980
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830250203
Subject(s) - outcome (game theory) , dilemma , stochastic game , mathematical economics , prisoner's dilemma , superrationality , traveler's dilemma , economics , strategic dominance , pareto principle , strategy , pareto optimal , repeated game , symmetric game , microeconomics , game theory , normal form game , computer science , mathematics , set (abstract data type) , operations management , geometry , programming language
In deciding between the two alternatives of a nonconstant‐sum 2 × 2 game, a player can be thought to be subjected to conflicting pressures to choose the one or the other. Thus in prisoner's dilemma the pressure to choose the dominating (noncooperative) strategy is opposed by the pressure to choose the cooperative strategy which contains the Pareto optimal outcome which both players prefer. In this game, as in many others, motivations to choose a strategy may be confounded. Thus, the dominating strategy in prisoner's dilemma is dictated by the “sure thing principle” and by the prospect of getting the largest payoff and by a desire to avoid unreciprocated cooperation. The present paper reports an experiment on 2 × 2 games in which motivational pressures have been separated out as far as possible. In particular, in six of the eight games one of the players is indifferent between his strategies with regard to his own payoffs; so that the predominance of choices of the one or the other strategies can be attributed to motivations which take only the other's payoffs into account.