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The asymptotic likelihood of agreement between plurality and condorcet outcomes
Author(s) -
Gillett Raphael
Publication year - 1980
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830250104
Subject(s) - condorcet method , voting , mathematical economics , majority rule , relation (database) , mathematics , approval voting , distortion (music) , work (physics) , econometrics , computer science , political science , artificial intelligence , law , data mining , amplifier , computer network , bandwidth (computing) , politics , mechanical engineering , engineering
This article deals with collective decision making by voting procedures in living systems at the levels of groups, organizations, societies, or supranational systems. General principles are outlined which permit the determination of the likelihood of agreement, and disagreement, between plurality and Condorcet outcomes when system size is large, for any number of alternatives in virtually any culture. A method is developed which ascertains, for any number of alternatives, the system in which the likelihood of plurality/Condorcet disagreement reaches a maximum. The hypothesis that an inverse relation exists between the probability of plurality distortion and the probability of the paradox of voting is disproved. Methodological issues arising from previous work are considered.