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Deterrence and arms races: An optimal control systems model
Author(s) -
Gillespie John V.,
Zinnes Dina A.,
Tahim G. S.,
Sampson Martin W.,
Schrodt Philip A.,
Michael Rubison R.
Publication year - 1979
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830240404
Subject(s) - adversary , deterrence (psychology) , deterrence theory , construct (python library) , control (management) , computer security , mathematical economics , stability (learning theory) , game theory , arms control , computer science , economics , operations research , mathematics , political science , law and economics , law , artificial intelligence , machine learning , programming language
A mathematical model representing the notion of deterrence theory, as depicted in the literature, is studied. This model applies to decision processes of supranational systems. A nation deters its adversary by its capacity to absorb a first attack and to render a retaliatory attack. To construct the model representing this, concepts from the optimal control theory are used. The optimal policy is derived and the parameters in the model are estimated from defense expenditures of various nations involved in three post‐World War II arms races. From the model so constructed, the stability properties of three current arms races are analyzed.