Counterpart strategy, prior relations, and constituent pressure in a bargaining simulation

This article concerns decision making by bargaining in systems at the levels of groups, organizations, societies, and supranational systems. A 2 × 2 × 2 (conflictual or peaceful × strong or weak × cooperative‐competitive or competitive‐cooperative) factorial design was used to examine the effects of the prior relationship between the bargaining parties, constituent pressure on the bargaining representative, and the counterpart's strategy. The dependent variables were subject decisions in the bargaining simulation, attitudinal factors, and future intentions. Data were collected from 160 male subjects in a laboratory simulation of group interactions. The task consisted of assuming the role of a management bargaining representative and making ten bargaining decisions on various issues. Results indicated that a cooperative‐competitive counterpart strategy gave a higher level of overall subject cooperation, but a more competitive final decision, a less favorable attitude toward the counterpart, and less willingness to retain the counterpart in future bargaining. Strong constituent pressure produced greater subject competitiveness, but a more negative attitude toward the constituent. Peaceful prior relations resulted in a more cooperative initial decision, but did not affect the overall level of cooperation. Interactive effects showed that subjects encountering a cooperative‐competitive strategy and conflictual prior relations were more willing to participate in future bargaining when they received strong constituent pressure. Conversely, if a competitive‐cooperative strategy and peaceful relations occurred, there was more willingness to participate in the future when weak constituent pressure existed.