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A paradigm for bargaining and a test of two bargaining models
Author(s) -
Heckathorn Douglas
Publication year - 1978
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830230204
Subject(s) - bargaining problem , equity (law) , economics , microeconomics , outcome (game theory) , mathematical economics , bargaining power , political science , law
A new experimental paradigm for two‐person bargaining is introduced. It can be applied to decision making in two‐person systems at the level of the group as well as at the level of the organization, the society, and the supranational system. The paradigm is used in a comparative evaluation of the Nash and Smorodinsky‐Kalai solutions to the bargaining problem. The aim is to devise a means for experimentally analyzing two‐person two‐party bargaining processes which avoids a number of difficulties afflicting previous experimental paradigms. In particular, the paradigm presented here is intended to control equity and related processes as they affect the process and outcome of bargaining. A discussion of means for conceiving equity and related processes using the Nash and Smorodinsky‐Kalai bargaining models is provided together with an illustration of procedures for experimentally controlling them. The experimental results strongly support the Smorodinsky‐Kalai model over the Nash model.