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Collective Indecision
Author(s) -
Gillett Raphael
Publication year - 1977
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830220603
Subject(s) - condorcet method , property (philosophy) , preference , mathematical economics , outcome (game theory) , group (periodic table) , mathematics , statistics , combinatorics , econometrics , psychology , voting , epistemology , chemistry , philosophy , organic chemistry , politics , political science , law
A desirable property of a collective choice procedure in human groups is that its outcome should be clear‐cut. The plurality and Condorcet procedures are investigated under a variety of conditions to determine their susceptibility to indecisiveness. Both plurality indecision and Condorcet indecision can attain a large likelihood of occurrence when group size is small. However, both likelihoods, but especially the latter's, prove highly volatile in the presence of minor variations in group size when group size is small. In general, the relative decisiveness of the two procedures fluctuates as a function of the pattern of the group's preference probabilities. An exception is groups of four and six members where plurality indecision is always less likely than Condorcet indecision. When it is required that the plurality winner receive more than 50 percent of the votes, the probability of Condorcet indecision is always less than or equal to the probability of plurality indecision, irrespective of the pattern of the group's preference probabilities.