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A competitive test of the 𝔪 1 ( im ) bargaining set, kernel, and equal share models
Author(s) -
Michener H. Andrew,
And Kenneth Yuen,
Ginsberg Irving J.
Publication year - 1977
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830220505
Subject(s) - core (optical fiber) , set (abstract data type) , kernel (algebra) , stochastic game , test (biology) , mathematical economics , mathematics , economics , function (biology) , social psychology , microeconomics , econometrics , psychology , combinatorics , computer science , telecommunications , paleontology , evolutionary biology , biology , programming language
An experiment was conducted to test three competing theories of payoff allocation in n ‐person conflicts. One hundred‐eighty subjects participated in three‐person groups. Subjects were decision makers in nonconstant sum games with sidepayments and nonempty core. With respect to coalition formation, the results showed a propensity for coalitions with large characteristic function values to form more frequently than coalitions with smaller values. With respect to payoffs, results indicated that the M 1 (im) bargaining set based on the Shapley standard of fairness predicted the observed allocations more accurately than either the kernel theory or the equal share model. The results also showed that relatively few outcomes fell in the core, a surprising observation given the theoretical prominence of this concept. Findings are discussed in the light of previous experimental research on n‐person conflicts.