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Group provision of step goods
Author(s) -
Hardin Russell
Publication year - 1976
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830210204
Subject(s) - condorcet method , dilemma , prisoner's dilemma , microeconomics , social dilemma , economics , game theory , mathematical economics , public economics , mathematics , voting , politics , political science , geometry , law
Many social goods can be provided only in discrete steps rather than over a wide range or continuum of levels. The problems which groups face in voluntarily providing such goods are in some respects peculiarly different from those faced in providing continuous goods. When provision of step goods is analyzed as a binary choice game, it is a prisoner's dilemma. For small ratios of benefits to costs, there is a Condorcet choice solution in which all contribute; for high ratios ironically there is no Condorcet choice. When the game is expanded to allow a wide range of levels of individual contribution, it ceases to be prisoner's dilemma, although noncontribution may still be the individualistically rational strategy. The analysis applies to any group whose members, persons, organizations, nations, any mixture of these, etc., have a common interest in a step good and can calculate benefits and costs of provision of the good.