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The effect of risk and pressure on coalition behavior in a triadic situation
Author(s) -
Simpson Douglas B.,
Punwani Prem A.
Publication year - 1975
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830200305
Subject(s) - certainty , stochastic game , psychology , economics , microeconomics , social psychology , epistemology , philosophy
Conflicting hypotheses on coalition formation, and the division of payoff after coalition success were tested experimentally in the triadic situation where A > B, B = C , and A < B + C . The results provided significant support for the prediction that under certainty coalition BC is the most likely coalition, and that under uncertainty coalitions between A and B or A and C are the two most likely coalitions. The hypothesis that the formation of any one coalition can be enhanced by the communication variable was not supported. Except under uncertainty with written communication, there was no evidence to support the anticompetitive behavior predicted for the female coalition formations. However the findings did support an anticompetitive attitude after coalition success. The results provided significant support for the hypothesis that partners tend to divide the payoff in proportion to their contribution to coalition resources.