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Social decision schemes and two‐person bargaining
Author(s) -
Wadington James
Publication year - 1975
Publication title -
behavioral science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.371
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1099-1743
pISSN - 0005-7940
DOI - 10.1002/bs.3830200303
Subject(s) - monopoly , task (project management) , microeconomics , bargaining power , group decision making , social psychology , economics , psychology , collective bargaining , group (periodic table) , mathematical economics , labour economics , management , chemistry , organic chemistry
This experiment deals with an explanation of two‐person group systems, or dyads, bargaining in a bilateral monopoly situation in terms of a special case of a general group decision theory proposed by J. H. Davis (1973). Dyads completed one symmetric and one asymmetric bargaining task. The model of bargaining behavior fitted the dyads' decisions for price but not for quantity. There were some differences noted in the difficulty of the two types of bargaining tasks.